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BROOKE OPHARDT The College at Brockport, State University of New York 
 
 
Body Autonomy During Pregnancy: 
 
Where Did It Go? 
This paper takes a personal yet informative look at body autonomy during pregnancy, examining the laws 
that remove autonomy from pregnant women with a look at how that affects women overall. The paper 
uses feminist theory to examine how the commodification of reproduction has stripped women of their body 
autonomy during their pregnancies and argues how women throughout history have largely been valued 
only for reproductive purposes.  
Introduction 
The idea that women are only good for reproductive value is something that is echoed in 
society. We see that with the obsession with reproductive rights and freedoms in the 
media and all over most of the social media platforms we have today. I am a mother to 
two daughters. I know that for both of my pregnancies, I and any other pregnant women 
were the center of the office where I worked. Food decisions were made to cater to our 
whims, jokes were made whenever we sat too close together, or that there must have 
been something in the building’s water. Frankly, I never had so much attention paid to 
me by co-workers. Usually I just did my job wherever I was and sometimes I socialized 
with a few people I liked more than the others. But I was also told at both jobs that my 
pregnancies were keeping me from being promoted – one employer specifically told me
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the promotion was waiting for me when 
I came back to work after having my first 
child. Talk about pressure to go back to 
work after delivering a baby two months 
ago! That was one of the times that I 
realized that my value to others was 
wrapped up in my reproductive actions. 
It made sense when our species’ 
prominent worry was survival, 
reproduction, and sustenance. But even 
though we have evolved past survival 
mode, society’s view on women and the 
value they provide has not moved passed 
reproduction. We see that with the 
national and international policing of 
pregnancies resulting in forced 
caesareans, abortion restrictions, and the 
increased change of the meaning of fetus 
viability. In this essay, I look at how the 
legal commodification of reproduction 
has stripped women of their body 
autonomy during their pregnancies, 
compromising their personal and public 
lives.  
Theoretical Framework 
When you began to examine the almost 
infinite body of feminist thought on the 
various avenues that commodify the 
female body, it gets pretty 
overwhelming. There have been so 
many theorists who have looked at how 
women’s bodies have been bought, sold, 
and taken over both literally and 
figuratively throughout generations. 
Susan Bordo (2004) is one feminist 
theorist who has written extensively on 
the topic of body autonomy during 
pregnancy and how placing such a high 
value on reproduction ends up placing 
most women at a disadvantage to the 
fetus growing inside them. This 
disadvantage usually is a consequence to 
various legislations that give more rights 
to the fetus than the mother carrying it. 
Bordo (2004) writes that, “…the 
ideology of women-as-fetal-incubator is 
stronger than ever and is making ever 
greater encroachments into pregnant 
women’s lives” (p. 81). She explains that 
even though the Supreme Court banned 
certain policies that restrict pregnant 
women in the workplace through ‘fetal 
protection,’ the opposite was happening 
as she was writing her book and the 
nation was becoming obsessed with fetal 
rights (Bordo, 2004). I completely agree 
with her idea that our national society 
looks at fetuses as separate persons with 
equal or overriding rights to the women 
who carry them. We see that today in the 
“pro-life” movement with their position 
that a life begins at conception, and 
therefore, fetuses should have the same 
rights as all autonomous beings, except 
for pregnant women.  
Once we introduce feminist theory 
and legislation, it is important to look 
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into the history surrounding 
reproductive rights. Ricki Solinger 
(2013) is a curator and a historian, and 
even though she is not a theorist in the 
existential sense, she has written 
extensively about the laws surrounding 
reproduction. Solinger (2013) points out 
how after Roe v. Wade, a landmark 
ruling that made abortion in the United 
States legal, passed in 1973, several 
groups worked to have political 
candidates elected to offices that would 
work around the laws to advance the 
“pro-life” agenda. One of the ways 
legislators began to work against Roe v. 
Wade was by restricting Medicaid funds 
for elective abortions (Solinger, 2013). 
By setting this political precedence early 
on, “pro-life” activists set the path for 
pregnant women of lower 
socioeconomic status to be 
disadvantaged through governmental 
legislation. As Solinger (2013) writes, 
“Even today, the political culture in the 
United States supports the reproductive 
rights of women who have abundant 
resources far more than it supports the 
rights of women with few resources” (p. 
159). The passing of Roe v. Wade is also 
when the idea of assigning ‘personhood’ 
to the fetus began, and Solinger (2013) 
theorizes that the introduction of 
ultrasound imaging aided in this new 
aspect of the “pro-life” movement. It is 
not hard to see the connection made 
between seeing the fetus growing inside 
of a woman’s body and wanting to assign 
it an identity. But it seems that with each 
advancement in reproductive 
technology, legislations that restrict 
pregnant women in some way followed, 
and the end result of all this legislative 
control puts the most vulnerable women 
at risk of losing themselves and their 
bodily autonomy.  
bell hooks (2000) is one of the more 
well-known black feminist theorists who 
looks at reproductive freedoms through 
an intersectional lens of race and class. 
The reason why I feel it is important to 
bring up her thoughts on reproductive 
justice is that hooks (2000) explains how 
“the abortion issue captured the 
attention of mass media because it really 
challenged…the notion that a women’s 
reason for existence was to bear 
children,” and I think that even though 
her quotes are from writings that 
originated in the 1960s, those words still 
apply to the type of social and mass 
media that we have today (p. 27). hooks 
(2000) also argues that because of the 
fascination with abortion as the ‘face’ of 
reproductive rights, it has led to keeping 
any other aspect of reproductive 
injustices – forced sterilizations and 
hysterectomies, for example – out of 
public discussion. As she puts it, 
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abortion “…called attention to a 
capitalist patriarchal male-dominated 
medical system that controlled women’s 
bodies and did with them anything they 
wanted to…” (hooks, 2000, p. 27). And 
she is right – reproductive rights and 
freedoms usually focus on access to safe 
abortions and birth control, not on what 
rights women are afforded while they are 
in pre- and perinatal care. And even 
though I do believe that access to safe 
and legal abortions is a right and not a 
privilege, I also believe that when we 
focus on only one hotly contested aspect 
of reproduction, we leave other areas of 
women’s health vulnerable to legal 
manipulations. Other theorists (Bordo, 
2004; Phillips, 2013; Solinger, 2013) have 
looked at this complication.  
Black feminist theorist, Angela Davis 
(1991) writes about reproductive 
commodification also through an 
intersectional lens of class and race. 
Davis (1991) points at how pregnancies 
were commodified pre-Civil War – 
before surrogacy – when black slave 
women were forced to have children in 
order to (eventually) have plenty of 
workers for their masters. This is 
possibly one of the first times in 
American history that reproduction was 
actually commodified – those babies 
born into slavery were being produced 
strictly as a product to be traded, used, 
sold, or killed. But Davis (1991) also 
argues that just as reproduction value 
separated one class of slaves from 
another, the advancement of surrogacy 
and other reproductive technologies 
does the same thing among free women. 
Reproduction as a market variable 
separates women with the ability to pay 
for reproductive services from women 
who lack resources to access this 
commodity.  Ultimately, this further 
separates the women who are able to and 
choose to provide the service of 
reproduction from those who cannot or 
choose not to engage in this type of 
work. Many feminist theorists (Bordo, 
2004; Davis, 1991; hooks, 2000; Phillips, 
2013; Solinger, 2013) have argued this 
point over the years. As Davis (1991) 
affirms, 
The availability of the technology 
further mythologizes motherhood 
as the true vocation of women. In 
fact, the new reproductive medicine 
sends out a message to those who 
are capable of receiving it: 
motherhood lies just beyond the 
next technology (p. 455). 
It’s important to note the last sentence 
of this quote: “…to those who are capable 
of receiving it…” Davis (1991), like 
Solinger (2013), is quick to remind us 
that not every woman is going to be able 
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to access reproductive technology. We 
also have to keep in mind that access to 
the technology is controlled by the 
patriarchal and capitalist systems that 
modern medicine is beholden to, like 
hooks (2000) reminded us earlier. 
Importantly, these reproductive systems 
are known to be the most non-inclusive 
of social structures that exist today.  
Anne Phillips (2013) is a theorist who 
looks at the commodification of 
reproduction through surrogacy, but 
through the lens of enforceable 
contracts.  She writes, “It is also worth 
stressing the general notion of bodies as 
different is widely recognized in law….” 
(p. 82).  Philips points out, like Bordo 
(2004), that the laws quite blatantly treat 
pregnant women far more restrictively 
than most other people. Philips (2013) 
uses the example of reneging on a 
contract to exchange property for cash 
versus a contract of services rendered by 
a specific person via their body, and 
where the law would stand on 
contractual enforceability. Phillips 
argues that the very nature of involving 
the body illegitimates most of the bodily 
restrictions in surrogacy contracts, but 
since we have commodified 
reproduction in this way, we’ve come to 
accept that women’s bodies are 
purposed for reproduction, and we 
ignore the legal hypocrisy. Phillips 
(2013) also argues that this 
commodification of reproduction has 
further separated women through a class 
divide of women who use their body to 
provide a service (surrogacy) and women 
who pay for it (consumption). She 
specifically mentions India’s income gap 
between the surrogates and the 
“commissioning parents” as proof of 
this happening in modern society 
(Phillips, 2013). But the final point 
important to Phillips’ theory falls on the 
debate surrounding body autonomy and 
property involving the commodification 
of reproduction, particularly, ways the 
“…discomfort with the language of 
property amongst those whose activities 
otherwise seem to embrace it….” 
conveys “…significant indictment” 
(Phillips, 2013, p. 66). What Phillips 
(2013) means by this is that the very 
people we would expect to embrace the 
idea of self-body autonomy (the 
surrogates and others who perform 
bodily transactions), in reality, are not, 
and the fact that they aren’t should speak 
volumes to the imbalance society legally 
affords pregnant women during 
contractual surrogacy.  
The “language of property” that 
Phillips (2013) refers to is the contractual 
language that surrounds transactions 
involving the body and how similar to 
property terms they tend to be. Using 
84 Dissenting Voices, v. 5, Spring 2016 
 
the property example as earlier 
described, pregnant women serving as 
surrogates are the only people whose 
bodily transactions are afforded the 
same leverage as property disputes and 
decided as such, where most other 
contracts involving body services will 
favor the body autonomy of the servicer. 
Some might argue that a women 
providing surrogacy services knows 
what she is signing up for, literally; 
surrogacy contracts are usually gone 
over extensively before final signing. But 
when body autonomy rights are chipped 
away in little pieces here and there with 
popular legislation in specific situations, 
it makes it much easier to move on to 
other areas of personal rights in 
reproduction.  
Rickie Solinger (2013) concedes the 
awkwardness surrounding the topic of 
reproductive justice as we see it in 
today’s society. Solinger (2013) argues, 
“The impact of public policies and 
societal attitudes on the reproductive 
decisions of women may be a 
particularly difficult insight to bring into 
focus, in part, because of the way that 
personal choice has become the dominant 
way characterizing pregnancy and 
motherhood in recent times” (p. 3). 
What Solinger means by this is that 
we’ve spent so much time focusing on 
the fact that (some) women have choices 
now, choices regarding birth control and 
IVF treatments, that we forget that there 
are many women who do not have 
access to the same choices for various 
socioeconomic reasons. Phillips (2013) 
points out this imbalance using India as 
the example, as do hooks (2000) and 
Davis (1991) in discussing women, race, 
and reproduction. 
Another interesting perspective to 
consider in the body autonomy question 
comes from the field of anthropology. In 
anthropological writings, Sweeney and 
Hodder (2002) discount how women 
have changed the way bodies have been 
looked at over time, and it is worth 
noting that other disciplines are noticing 
the work women’s movements have 
made. When Sweeney and Hodder 
(2002) write, “…the Women’s 
Movement and various forms of 
feminism have turned attention to the 
body as part of a wider critique and 
overturning of male control and 
objectification” (p.3), it feels somewhat 
satisfying to see women and our efforts 
being recognized in other, male-
dominated fields of study. This writing 
also shows that there is a recognition 
that women’s bodies are utilized in ways 
that are completely different than men’s 
bodies are and that there is work being 
done to change it.  
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Something else that I think is 
important to point out after discussing 
some of the theoretical framework 
surrounding women’s bodies is the span 
of time that these particular theorists 
have been discussing the 
commodification of reproduction. I am 
only looking at arguments that have 
been made in the last twenty years or so, 
and I am only using some of the authors 
that I am familiar with in my research. 
This is important to point out is because 
it is worth noting that we are still having 
this debate surrounding a woman’s right 
to choose what is best for her body 
today, just like these theorists were 
writing about the ramifications of 
women losing body autonomy in 1991, 
2003, 2004, and 2013. As part of my 
argument about reproduction and body 
autonomy, I introduce two recent cases 
of women in the national news who both 
had their body autonomy stripped from 
them, making the women human 
incubators for the sake of their fetuses. 
The end results of both cases are 
disturbing to say the least, and the 
consequences of both cases were 
completely avoidable if both women’s 
wishes were respected regarding their 
bodies and medical care.  
Marlise and the Law 
One case where a woman’s body 
autonomy did not apply to her anymore 
because of her pregnancy is the 
circumstances surrounding Marlise 
Munoz and her pregnancy. Munoz was a 
33-year-old married mother of one child, 
living in Texas and pregnant with 
another when she suffered a blood clot 
in her lungs and collapsed at her home 
on November 26, 2013 (Curry, 2014; 
Lavandera, Rubin, & Botelho, 2014). 
When she was admitted to John Peter 
Smith Hospital, in Fort Worth, Texas, it 
was found that both Munoz and her 
fetus experienced significant oxygen 
loss, which resulted in diminished brain 
activity (Curry, 2014; Powell, 2014). 
Because of this development, Munoz 
was declared brain dead and the hospital 
was made aware of her wishes not to be 
kept alive artificially (Lavandera, et al., 
2014). The hospital refused to take her 
off of life sustaining machines, citing a 
Texas law that prevents pregnant 
women from being denied life-
sustaining medical treatment for the 
benefit of the unborn child and statutes 
that stated that living wills became 
invalidated when pregnant (Curry, 2014; 
FindLaw, 2015). And let me interject to 
say that yes, you read that right: a 
hospital in Texas interpreted the law to 
mean that they were legally supposed to 
keep Munoz on life-sustaining treatment 
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for the sake of her fetus, even though 
Munoz, as the patient, was medically 
brain-dead, and multiple family 
members expressed that Munoz’s final 
wishes were that medical treatment not 
intervene.   
For almost two months, Munoz’s 
family went to court repeatedly to 
challenge this law while the hospital 
fought back, arguing that they were 
following the law and that they were 
correct in applying it to this particular 
case (Lavandera, et al., 2014). In January 
of 2014, a judge ruled that the hospital 
had to take Munoz off of life support 
and release her body to family 
(Lavandera, et al., 2014), but the base of 
his ruling does not address the law. 
Judge Wallace ruled that John Peter 
Smith Hospital had to remove Munoz 
from the ventilation machines, not 
because the law was improperly applied, 
but because testing had proved that the 
fetus was developing so abnormally that 
it was no longer viable (Lavandera, et al., 
2014). It is worrisome that the judge only 
ruled because of the viability of the fetus 
and not the person whose end-of-life 
decisions were being violated. Texas is 
not the only state with laws like this; 
almost half of the country has similar 
statutes. The wide variations between 
the states’ statutes regarding living wills 
and pregnancy portray the many legal 
complexities surrounding women and 
reproduction. The complete list to state 
statutes is significant, since there are 
wide variations between the states’ 
statutes regarding living wills and 
pregnancy. You can see the complete list 
and the wordings here: 
www.estate.findlaw.com. 
Lucky Me? 
Living in New York State meant that 
when I went to deliver my baby, I was 
asked to fill out a form to appoint a 
health proxy since I did not have a living 
will. In contrast to the tragic situation 
with Marlise Munoz, the hospital along 
with the state made sure that I would 
have a voice at a time when my own 
health could be impacted. I would hope 
that by taking those extra steps when 
admitting me for delivery of my children 
meant that those wishes would be 
honored if needed. Unlike New York 
State, there are 25 other states along with 
Texas that also invalidate a woman’s 
living will when they are pregnant 
(FindLaw, 2015). The laws and 
legislation surrounding pregnant women 
are unlike any other when it comes to 
autonomy, as the multiple statutes that 
exist across states reveal. Susan Bordo 
(2004) argues that philosophically, the 
human body has been looked at as the 
one thing a person owns outright since 
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their birth, and that the United States 
legal system reflects that in the 
legislation passed by the Highest Court 
over 100 years ago. As argument, Bordo 
(2004) cites numerous lawsuits where 
the judges ruled in the favor of individual 
body autonomy over instances involving 
forced blood or tissue donation. Bordo 
(2004) even used one specific case where 
the judge ruled that the possible donor 
did not have to follow through with 
donation, even though the person was so 
ill they died two weeks after the ruling. 
But Bordo (2004) goes on to explain 
how pregnant women are excluded from 
the legal protections people like that 
donor was afforded: “As a number of 
analysts have pointed out, there are no 
legal justifications for the discrepancies 
between treatment accorded to pregnant 
women and that given to non-pregnant 
persons” (p. 78). Why would pregnant 
women be afforded different treatment 
legally? Some people may argue that they 
need to think of the rights of the fetus 
growing inside of the woman, but I 
counter argue that when we place such 
importance on a fetus that is still 
completely dependent on the woman’s 
body for survival, we ultimately put 
women’s lives at risk. We also erase the 
woman and her body as person with all 
personhood rights.  
Why Does This Matter? 
When she was 17 weeks pregnant, Savita 
Halappanavar reported to University 
Hospital Galway, Ireland, on October 
21, 2012, to receive care for a miscarriage 
(Darby, 2012). While she was admitted 
to the hospital, her membranes 
ruptured, meaning her ‘water broke,’ and 
the staff informed her that her fetus was 
dying (Darby, 2012; Health Information 
and Quality Authority (HIQA), 2013, p. 
36). After hearing this, Halappanavar 
repeatedly asked for an abortion but was 
informed that since there was a fetal 
heartbeat that abortion is illegal under 
Irish law (Darby, 2012). She was also 
told by the midwife at the hospital, Ann 
Maria Burke, that “…Ireland is a 
Catholic country” (Darby, 2013), 
implying that Halappanavar will not be 
obtaining the services she feels she needs 
for her health and safety. Instead, 
Halappanavar’s care plan included 
monitoring her condition and to start 
administering antibiotics for her 
membranes that ruptured 21 hours’ 
prior (HIQA, 2013). During the 
following six days that Halappanavar 
was hospitalized, she and her fetus’ 
condition deteriorated so much that 
Halappanavar had a spontaneous 
delivery of her miscarrying fetus, went 
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into septic shock, and died from 
septicemia (Darby, 2012; HIQA, 2013).  
It is absolutely deplorable that a 
woman died from septic shock due to a 
miscarriage while she was hospitalized 
for almost a week. Because of her death, 
members of the Health Service 
Executive (HSE) – Ireland’s health 
service providers – asked the Health 
Information and Quality Authority 
(HIQA), Irelands independent firm that 
aids with the oversight and 
implementation of health and social care 
services, to investigate the hospital’s 
policies surrounding clinical 
deterioration (HIQA, 2013). What they 
found is that the hospital did not comply 
with several of its own protocols and 
missed several opportunities to 
intervene in Halappanavar’s care plans 
to make adjustments to save her life 
(HIQA, 2013). I bring up the Savita 
Halappanavar case to show that 
extremes using laws to protect fetal 
viability can ultimately kill the mother of 
said fetus. This was a completely 
preventable death; hospital personnel 
could have saved Halappanavar’s life a 
total of eleven times over the course of 
the four days that she was in the 
intensive care unit at University Hospital 
Galway, but they did not provide the 
proper care to do so (HIQA, 2013). 
Much like Munoz, Savita Halappanavar 
was viewed as secondary to her fetus’ 
health and there was no reason to deny 
her a life-saving abortion and no reason 
for her to die. But when women are 
viewed as reproductive incubators and 
stripped of the right to make 
autonomous decisions, we can expect to 
see more cases of pregnant women dying 
from easily preventable causes. 
Women, Bodies, and Reproductive 
Worth 
What do these cases say about how we 
view the actual worth of a woman when 
we are being reduced to body parts in 
close to every aspect of our lives? 
Women have been asking and answering 
this question for decades; a whole 
discipline in higher education arose from 
it. And through this radical school of 
thought is where Davis (1991) argues 
about the commodification of 
reproduction through slavery and the 
implications that has had on women, but 
on women of color especially. Bordo 
(2004) takes it a step further and looks at 
all the ways that the laws are used against 
pregnant women, especially with the 
introduction of reproductive 
technology. One of my best friends’ 
favorite books is The Handmaid’s Tale, 
written by Margaret Atwood (1986). 
This is the novel that autonomy theorists 
point to as the end result of the 
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commodification of reproduction – a 
society where women are separated by 
reproductive fitness, and the ones who 
can reproduce are going to be 
controlled, monitored, and forced to 
bear children for the women who can no 
longer do so. In the book, Atwood 
(1986) accurately describes the 
introduction of credit and debit cards as 
a replacement to paper money, the 
government falsely blaming Islamist 
extremists for all of America’s problems, 
and a presidential assassination. Susan 
Bordo (2004) uses this fictional tale in 
her writings to describe the types of laws 
that we can expect to see if fetal 
personhood rights become the norm, 
and I use it to show the parallels to what 
is happening in today’s society. 
The toxic political climate that 
surrounds us today is trickling down into 
the argument surrounding reproductive 
rights and freedoms and leaves many 
women scared for what awaits in five or 
ten years. Some argue that Roe v. Wade 
is law and cannot be changed or 
repealed; since the right to an abortion is 
legally protected, what are we worried 
about? The two examples of restricted 
body autonomy during pregnancy I 
bring up is exactly what we should be 
worried about as governments across 
states continue to introduce other 
restrictive legislation that applies to 
reproduction. For example, what kind of 
message are we sending our children 
when they see that women are going to 
jail for miscarrying a child? Solinger 
(2013) argues: 
Finally, fetuses may be harmed most 
when pregnant women are defined 
as potential or actual violators of 
fetal rights. The characterization 
may cause pregnant women who 
need help to avoid prenatal care 
providers, health care facilities, and 
other institutions where they have 
god reason to expect to be judged 
and punished instead of provided 
with services (p. 93). 
Purvi Patel went to the hospital after 
she miscarried her 20-plus week fetus 
alone and was ultimately sentenced to 
twenty years for feticide under new 
Indiana law (Chowdhury, 2015). Even 
though there was no evidence that she 
actually did anything to harm her fetus 
while in utero or after delivery, Patel was 
punished for seeking out medical 
services after suffering a traumatic event 
(Chowdhury, 2015). She may be the first 
woman sentenced, but she’s not the only 
one to be charged in Indiana; Bei Bei 
Shuai, in a failed suicide attempt while 
pregnant, also was charged with feticide 
under the same law and also faced jail 
time before accepting a plea deal 
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(Penner, 2013). According to Solinger 
(2013), “Almost forty states have ‘fetal 
homicide’ laws for dealing with crimes 
against…” fetuses (p. 93). As we see in 
Indiana, conservative politicians will 
absolutely take advantage of these laws 
to persecute women who may engage in 
behaviors some deem ‘unsuitable’ for 
pregnant women. This is what women 
look forward to when personhood laws 
give more rights to the fetus than the 
woman – policing every move every 
pregnant woman makes to insure 
complete safety and autonomy for the 
person growing inside of her while the 
laws undermine the woman’s own health 
and safety.  
When a woman’s body is legislated and 
regimented to the point of 
depersonalization, commodification is 
right around the corner. We already have 
commodified reproduction in some 
ways, for example, surrogacy contracts 
and how they strip women of basic 
autonomous rights is the basis of 
Bordo’s (2004) body autonomy theory 
and Phllips (2013) surrogacy arguments. 
Are we ultimatly going to face a society 
where women who can reproduce are 
forced to ‘provide’ for those who can’t? 
We may not need to have the same 
reproductive ceremonies that Atwood 
(1986) describes in her dystopian future, 
but forcing women to donate their eggs 
may not be that far off from reality and 
is certainly plausible with today’s 
technology. So is criminalizing pregnant 
women who transgress conservative 
ideologies about female bodies and 
reproductive utility.  
Conclusion 
In doing research for what various 
theorists have written about body 
autonomy during pregnancy, I selected 
writings that provided good 
explanations as to why focusing on 
reproductive justice is important to 
women’s studies as a whole. Monica 
Basile (2015) is a doula and an educator 
who has conducted extensive studies on 
the role doulas play in the birthing 
process and in reproduction overall. 
During one of her field studies, Basile 
(2015) quotes a doula using the 
pseudonym Megan Tate who says, 
“When women reclaim the right to birth 
on their own terms they might feel more 
empowered to challenge other forms of 
oppression and discrimination in their 
lives” ( p. 227). It is extremely important 
to recognize and fight all forms of 
oppression, but she’s right – if women 
do not feel like they have any say over 
their own bodies, how are they going to 
be able to fight for the rights of any other 
individual who are at an even greater 
disadvantage? And we also cannot 
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forget, in the fight for ‘fetal personhood 
rights,’ we are ultimately forgetting the 
rights of the woman carrying the fetus.  
When studying Munoz’s and 
Halappanavar’s cases, I came across 
another quote that also sums up my 
arguments: “Women have the right to 
die in dignity. The goal of fetal rescue 
does not exonerate healthcare givers 
from the duty to respect this right of the 
primary patient—the woman” (Dickens,  
2011, p. 85). This quote perfectly sums 
up my argument surrounding the 
restrictions laws place on women and 
their bodies during pregnancy. We have 
become a society that places more rights 
on a fetus than the person who is actually 
sustaining said fetus. I think society 
needs to treat women with the same 
dignity and respect that organ donors are 
afforded – basic human autonomy.
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Figure 1.  From "Where pregnant women are forced to stay on life support", by A. Scheller, 2014 
(http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/08/pregnant-living-will-_n_4562964.html). In the public domain. 
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